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ESSAY
THE ECONOMICS OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Avery Wiener Katz*
For over a century, legal commentators have debated the relative merits
of formal and substantive approaches to the interpretation of contracts; in
recent years, the debate has increasingly been conducted in the language of
the economic approach to contract law. While this new wave of scholarship
has been relatively successful in relatingthe traditionaldebates overformalism to specific transactional and institutionalproblems such as imperfect
information, it has been less productive in terms of generatinguseful legal or
policy recommendations. This Essay proposes a different approach: one that
focuses on private rather than public legal decisionmakers as its primary
audience. In general, private lawmakers are better able to make practicaluse
of the economic analysis of contracts, in part because the detailed information that is necessary to implement such analysis intelligently is likelier to be
available at the individuallevel. Furthermore,there are many opportunities
for contractingparties to choose between relatively formal and relatively substantive interpretive regimes. What is needed is a basic taxonomy of economic considerations that can serve as an organizingframework for parties
choosing between form and substance when designing contracts. The later
part of the Essay sets out such a framework.
INTRODUCTION

Under the modern American law of contracts, almost all applications
of legal doctrine turn on questions of interpretation; and almost all questions of interpretation implicate the tension between form and substance.
In one sense, this fact is neither remarkable nor distinctive. In order for
any legal directive to have an effect on human behavior, it must be applied to particular cases-an agent seeking to enforce or comply with a
given regulation must determine its content and then compare it to a
specific factual context.1 Accordingly, the materials admissible at the in* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. E-mail:
avkatz@law.columbia.edu. I am grateful to Mel Eisenberg, Allan Farnsworth, Victor
Goldberg, Randy Picker, Bob Scott, and workshop participants at Stanford, Boalt,
Michigan, Columbia, and the University of Chicago law schools for helpful comments, and
to the Dean's Summer Research Fund at Columbia Law School for financial support.
1. For instance, a contract that provides that the seller must deliver six boxes of
widgets by mid-July or face liability for the buyer's lost profits requires a performing or
enforcing agent to determine, inter alia, what objects count as widgets and boxes, what acts
count as delivery, which dates in July count as mid-July, what flows of costs and benefits
count as profits, and, as a prerequisite to all of these, whether the contract ever attained
the status of a legal obligation. Each of these determinations requires the agent to gather
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terpretive stage, the manner in which interpretation is carried out, and
the parties' expectations regarding the interpretive process will all significantly shape the ways in which the contract provides incentives and allocates risk.
In another sense, however, interpretation looms especially large in
twenty-first-century American contract law, because under doctrinal provisions and practices as they have historically developed, the prescribed
interpretive process is a relatively elaborate and intensive one. The set of
materials considered relevant to interpretive inquiries is broad, and reasonably thorough attention to such materials is expected from those
charged with applying the law in general or the language of individual
agreements. As a result, the definitive resolution of interpretive questions requires a relatively larger degree of time and effort than would be
the case under a system that put stricter limits on the materials to be
considered or on the resources to be devoted to their consideration. Indeed, conventional scholarly wisdom holds that contractual disputes are
more difficult and expensive to resolve in the United States today than in
other common law countries such as England or Canada, or than in earlier historical periods such as the early twentieth century, in part because
2
of the greater resources demanded at the interpretive stage.
This question-how broad and thorough should the interpretive
process be?-is commonly articulated in terms of the dichotomy of form
versus substance. As such, it has long been a matter of professional and
academic debate, and has been widely discussed in both case law and
commentary. The question also underlies longstanding controversies in
public law subjects such as administrative and constitutional law, as well as
in the field of theoretical jurisprudence. Viewed from a pedagogical perspective, it surely presents one of the central conceptual themes of the
first-year contracts class.
More specifically, many rules3 of contract law have the effect of
privileging or emphasizing certain types of potentially relevant interpretive materials, and discounting or excluding others. Such rules are often
termed "formal" or "formalistic" because they confine the interpreter's
and consider evidence, and then to engage in an act of interpretation based on that
evidence.
2. See generally P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in AngloAmerican Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal
Institutions (1987) (contrasting the relatively formal nature of the English legal system
with the relatively substantive nature of the American); Robert S. Summers,
Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory 136-59 (1982) (discussing instrumentalist
critiques of the late nineteenth-century formalist legal method). In this Essay, in order to
maintain a more fluent and conversational style, I have generally not attempted to provide
exhaustive citations for propositions that would be reasonably familiar to (or at least
conventionally accepted by) specialists in the field.
3. For the sake of convenience and brevity, unless the context otherwise requires, in
this Essay I will use the term "rules" to denote any doctrine or principle that has
recognized legal status. "Rules" used in this way thus includes principles, standards, etc.
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attention to a subset of materials that may or may not give rise to the
same inferences as would the universe of materials as a whole. A more
"substantive" approach to contract interpretation, in contrast, would
attempt to come to a more all-things-considered understanding, based on
all of the materials reasonably available.
For example, the Statute of Frauds requires that certain agreements
be expressed in writing before they can be enforced. The Statute is subject to many well-known exceptions, but its general effect is to confer
special status on the written document as a determinant of contractual
liability. The parol evidence rule, which provides that a written document that integrates the parties' agreement may not be contradicted or
varied by evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral understandings, has
a similar consequence. Similarly, the law confers special significance on
certain symbols or gestures such as the seal (before it was abolished in
most jurisdictions), or on commercial terms of art such as "f.o.b." (abolished in the recently revised version of Article 2 of the U.C.C.).4 Even the
classical doctrine of consideration has been in part defended in such
5
terms.
As is well known to both students and scholars of contract law, however, for the past one hundred years or so the historical trend across the
board has been to water down such formal doctrines in favor of a more
all-things-considered analysis of what the parties may have meant in the
individual case. 6 The relative balance of formal and substantive approaches to interpretation varies among jurisdictions and among subfields of contract law, of course, and between statutory and common law
doctrines, with Article 2 of the U.C.C. representing the epitome of contemporary antiformalism. 7 But one sees this trend played out in all corners of the law of contracts: in the decline of the classical doctrine of
consideration and the associated rise in influence of the doctrine of
4. See U.C.C. §§ 2-319 to 2-324 (repealed 2003).
5. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799
(1941). Also note Holmes's famous aphorism, in Krell v. Codman, 28 N.E. 578, 578 (Mass.
1891), that "consideration is as much a form as a seal."
6. See generally Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in The Fall
and Rise of Freedom of Contract 61 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) [hereinafter E. Posner, The
Decline of Formality] (surveying and evaluating the descriptive theories that have been
offered to explain this development).
7. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 621, 621 (1975) (relating the antiformalist
jurisprudential views of that Article's chief drafter, Karl Llewellyn, to the interpretive
philosophy embodied in its text); Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial
Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in The
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 149, 150-51 (Jody S. Kraus
& Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) [hereinafter Scott, The Uniformity Norm] (criticizing Article
2's "functionalist strategy" on the grounds that it has neither encouraged the production of
standardized default rules for contracting nor enhanced the predictability of contractual
interpretation); see also various provisions and official comments to Article 2, including
U.C.C. section 1-201(3) on the definition of "agreement."

2004] FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

499

promissory estoppel;8 in the movement from traditional notions of caveat
emptor and the duty to read to the modern reasonableness-based approach to adhesion contracts; 9 in the Second Restatement's de-emphasis of
the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts;" in the development of doctrinal categories such as requirement, output and options
contracts that render enforceable arrangements that half a century ago
would have fallen afoul of traditional doctrines of mutuality and indefiniteness;"l in the decline of the perfect tender rule in sales law and the
associated expansion of the doctrine of substantial performance; 12 in the
decline of the mirror image rule as a device for resolving the battle of the
forms in favor of U.C.C. section 2-207's test of material difference;1 3 and
14
in the growth of the importance of the duty of good faith.
While legal commentators have long debated the relative merits of
these doctrinal developments, in recent years the debate has intensified;
in the field of contracts, this new debate has increasingly been conducted
in the language of the economic analysis of law. This flourishing of scholarship has followed in the wake of a wider school of thought that some
have labeled the "new formalism." 15 What is new about this new formal8. See generally Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974) (discussing this
development and speculating that estoppel would eventually displace classical bargain
theory as the primary basis for contractual obligation).
9. See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174 (1983) (contending that form terms contained in contracts of
adhesion should be considered presumptively unenforceable).
10. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 32, 62 (1981).
11. U.C.C. § 2-306 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Kreyer v. Driscoll, 159 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis. 1968) (contractor who left
significant amount of work unfinished was not entitled to recover on the contract on
grounds of substantial performance but instead could recover on a restitution theory);
Jacob &Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921) (holding that builder's failure
to install the promised brand of pipe would not entitle the homeowner to withhold
payment and that homeowner's measure of damages would be measured by difference in
value rather than cost of replacement, and observing that the result depends on
"[c]onsiderations partly of justice and partly of presumable intention").
13. Compare Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 620 (N.Y. 1915)
(holding that boilerplate term in plaintiffs standard form purchase order that requested
acknowledgment of the order prevented the order from being a valid acceptance of
defendant's offer to sell), with Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 499 (1st
Cir. 1962) (early section 2-207 case interpreting section 2-207(1)'s test of material
difference to find that plaintiffs response rejected defendant's original offer, and holding
defendant bound by contract on plaintiffs terms), and Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp.,
453 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (6th Cir. 1972) (interpreting section 2-207(1) more liberally so
that variance between forms would count as an acceptance on offeror's terms unless the
offeree expressly conditioned its acceptance on offeror's assent to the terms in offeree's
form).
14. See generally Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1982) (surveying
development of good faith doctrine in relation to its incorporation in the Second
Restatement of Contracts).
15. See, e.g., David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 842,
842-86 (1999); Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 1-5 (Stanford Law School, Public
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ism, both in contractual scholarship and elsewhere, is that it attempts explicitly to ground formalism in functional terms; it tries to show how formal methods of interpretation help to forward practical goals such as
efficiency, procedural fairness, and public accountability.
While this recent wave of economically influenced scholarship has
been relatively successful in relating the traditional debates over formalism to specific transactional and institutional problems such as imperfect
information, it has been less productive in terms of generating useful legal or policy recommendations. In part this is because the lessons of this
scholarship are very difficult to apply at the general level at which a court
or legislature must operate, and in part this is because public lawmakers
have their own self-interested reasons for preferring one interpretive approach over another. 1 6 But the fact remains that this new scholarship has
not yet influenced doctrinal developments and is not likely to do so in the
17
future.
This Essay proposes a different approach to the problem: one that
focuses on private rather than public legal decisionmakers as its primary
audience. In general, private lawmakers are likely to be in a better position to make practical use of the economic analysis of contracts, in part
because the detailed information that is necessary to implement such
analysis intelligently is much likelier to be available at the individual level.
Furthermore, there are many opportunities for contracting parties to
choose between relatively formal and relatively substantive interpretive
regimes. What is needed, accordingly, is a basic taxonomy of economic
considerations that can serve as an organizing framework for parties
choosing between form and substance when designing contracts.
The succeeding sections of the Essay develop an account of how it is
possible for private contracting parties to choose between form and substance ex ante, catalog the main considerations relevant to that choice,
and then explore how the parties can use their local knowledge regarding such considerations to improve the efficiency of their agreements.
The organization of the discussion is as follows: Part I outlines and critiques the recent literature on formalism in contractual interpretation, and
elaborates on my argument that legal scholarship in the area should focus on addressing private transactional lawyers, not public decisionmakers such as courts and legislators. Part II sets out my basic analytiLaw and Legal Series Working Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=200732 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
16. See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Political
Economy] (ascribing the U.C.C.'s interpretive strategy, and in particular Article 2's
preference for standards over rules, to the private interests of the various groups and
individuals involved in its drafting).
17. Cf. Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success
or Failure?, 112 Yale L.J. 829, 830 (2003) (arguing generally that the "economic approach
does not explain the current system of contract law, nor does it provide a solid basis for
criticizing and reforming contract law").
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cal and normative framework; it defines more precisely what I mean by
form and substance, and discusses and critiques a theoretical argument
that has been influential in the traditional literature on contract interpretation: namely, the argument that formalist approaches to interpretation
are not coherent because all interpretation presumes some common basis of contextual knowledge between speaker and audience, and thus requires attention to the relevant context. Part III then discusses a variety
of familiar transactional problems such as costly information, risk allocation, rent-seeking, agency costs, and the protection of relational investments, and explains how these problems relate to the form/substance
distinction. Part IV offers some general principles regarding how these
problems might be addressed in contractual planning.
I. REFRAMING THE PROBLEM OF FORM VERSUS SUBSTANCE

The historical trend away from formal and toward substantive application of contract law has been alternately celebrated and criticized. Its
defenders, such as Corbin and Traynor, have emphasized the mismatch
between traditional formal categories and the complexity of commercial
reality, and have argued that a more substantive approach is required to
do justice to actual bargains and to protect commercial expectations.',8
Its critics, such as Williston and Hand, have countered that contracting
parties can adapt quite well to formal categories so long as the application of such categories remains clear and stable, and that substantive approaches, especially when applied by nonspecialist judges operating at a
distance from the commercial setting and susceptible to influence by a
host of popular and ideological considerations, tend to undermine the
certainty of exchange and to defeat the parties' intentions.' 9
18. See, e.g., Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 572B (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 2003)
("No contract should ever be interpreted and enforced with a meaning that neither party
gave it."); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641,
644-45 (Cal. 1968) (Traynor, C.J.) (holding that implementation of contracting parties'
intention requires "at least preliminary consideration of all credible evidence," and
observing that refusal to consider such evidence "would either deny the relevance of the
intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our
language has not attained").
19. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d. Cir. 1933)
(denying promissory estoppel claim in construction bid setting, on grounds that "[t]he
contractors had a ready escape from their difficulty by insisting upon a contract before
they used the figures, and in commercial transactions it does not in the end promote
justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves"); 2
Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 6:58 (4th ed.
1991):
It is theoretically possible that a contract may be formed which is in accordance
with the intention of neither party. If a written contract is entered into, the
meaning and effect of the contract depends on the interpretation given the
written language by the court. Traditionally, courts will give the language its
natural and appropriate meaning, and if the words are unambiguous, will
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A. The Economic Commentators' Views on Form/Substance Questions
The arguments of these two camps have framed both professional
and academic discussion of contract law for over a century. Until recently, however, contracts scholars influenced by the economic approach
to law have had relatively little to add to the form/substance debate. Instead, they have focused their attention on direct incentives for primary
behavior-such as performance, breach, and reliance investment-and
on doctrines and devices governing the allocation of risk, and have generally scanted interpretative problems.
The first attempts to bring economic analysis to bear on the question
of contract interpretation came in the area of default rules-that is, rules
that govern what courts should do when a contract is incomplete, silent,
or ambiguous with regard to a particular term of the exchange. 20 The
default-rule literature has flourished in recent years, to the point that the
21
concept has become a standard of contracts scholarship and teaching.
The creation of a default rule, however, still leaves parties and their
agents with the problems of determining when it comes into play, how to
tell whether the obligations prescribed by the rule have been satisfied,
what the parties must do to overcome the presumption that the rule apgenerally not admit evidence of what the parties may have thought the meaning
to be.
20. For instance, if a contract for the sale of goods makes no mention of warranties,
should the court interpret the contract as containing implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness, or as providing for caveat emptor? Similarly, if a sales contract makes no
mention of price, should a court fill the gap with a reasonable price measured at the time
of delivery (the rule under U.C.C. section 2-305), a reasonable price measured as of the
time of the making of the contract (the rule under Article 55 of the U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671, 684
(1980)), or decline to enforce the contract entirely?
21. This literature has become too vast to survey in a single footnote, but leading
articles include Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729
(1992); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815 (1991); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default
Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989); CharlesJ. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261 (1985); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990);
Symposium, Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1 (1993). For
a survey of this literature by one of its leading contributors, see Ian Ayres, Default Rules for
Incomplete Contracts, in I The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter New Palgrave Dictionary]. Contributors to this literature
have argued that default rules should be designed to minimize the direct costs of writing
contracts by choosing terms that most parties would want, to encourage the private
development of contractual terms of art, to discourage opportunism and rent-seeking in
drafting and performance, to encourage relatively informed parties to disclose their
private information up front, and to minimize the costs of ex-post Coasian bargaining.
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plies, and how to interpret their efforts when they try. 2 2 All these determinations require interpretations; such interpretation could in principle
be either formal or substantive. But on this last question, the default rule
23
literature has had little to say.
In the last several years, however, a number of economically-influenced scholars have turned their attention to the issue of form versus
substance, and in translating some of the traditional arguments over this
issue into economic language, have helped to clarify some of the traditional commentators' concerns. 24 In the field of contracts in particular,
arguments-or
this has resulted in somewhat of a renaissance of formalist
25
what one commentator has called "anti-antiformalism."
The most prominent of the new wave of contractual formalists is perhaps Lisa Bernstein, who, in a series of articles detailing the practices of
contracting parties in a variety of specialized markets (including the diamond, grain, and cotton trades), has argued that buyers and sellers who
deal regularly in a given market prefer to have their disputes governed by
the private rules and procedures supplied by their individual trade organizations. Her explanation for this preference is that those rules and procedures are more formalistic, and thus provide more certainty and protection at lower cost, than those that would be applied by generalist
courts applying the U.C.C.26 But other stalwarts of the economic approach to contract law, including Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz, have
also weighed in on the side of interpretative formalism. Scott, in particu22. To illustrate, the implied warranty of merchantability provides a default rule
regarding product quality in cases where the seller is a merchant; absent contrary
agreement, the goods are supposed be of a quality that would pass without objection in the
trade, be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, and the like. Under
U.C.C. section 2-314, however, the definition of merchantability turns on the nature of the
goods the parties understand themselves to be exchanging, and under U.C.C. section 2316, the merchantability warranty can be disclaimed by a conspicuous writing mentioning
the word "merchantability," by the buyer's inspection of the goods, by course of dealing,
course of performance, or usage of trade, or by an expression such as "as is" that "in
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty."
23. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 533, 564 (1998) [hereinafter E.
Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule] (critiquing the default-rule literature on this basis).
24. Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 150 passim (1995) [hereinafter Kaplow, Optimal Complexity]; Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke LJ. 557 (1992) [hereinafter Kaplow,
Rules].
25. Charny, supra note 15, at 842-46.
26. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724
(2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton] (explaining operation of trade rules and tribunals
in detail); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999) (suggesting that Article 2's
attempt to incorporate trade practice into its provisions is inconsistent with preferences of
commercial professionals as evidenced by industry dispute resolution practices).
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lar, has argued for some years that when government lawmakers attempt
to develop complex substantive regulations or default rules, or when they
look deeply into context when engaging in interpretive inquiries, they
discourage private actors from developing their own arrangements for
dealing with the underlying transactional problem. Because state
lawmakers can only operate at a general level, while private solutions to
transactional problems are likely to be better tailored to the needs of individual contracting parties, Scott concludes that clear and simple interpretive rules are best, even if on their face they appear to direct less-thanefficient outcomes. 27 More recently, both Scott and Schwartz, drawing
on work in the economic theory of incomplete contracts, have argued
that many common contractual devices are designed as responses to the
fact that generalist courts cannot effectively (that is, at reasonable cost
and with reasonable accuracy) determine the facts necessary to enforce
the parties' substantive bargain as they ideally would wish it to be enforced in a world of full and free information. For courts to ignore these
limitations and to try to enforce contracts as if they operated in a fullinformation world, they argue, disserves the parties' bargain and reduces
28
the expected value of their exchange.
The arguments of these new economic formalists have not gone unchallenged. With regard to lawmaking in general, Louis Kaplow has
shown, using a formal decision-theoretic model, that the optimal choice
between rules and standards, and the optimal level of complexity of legal
rules, depends upon empirical considerations such as the relative cost of
ex ante and ex post decisionmaking, the costs of information acquisition,
and the probability that a dispute will arise. 29 While limits on judicial
competence do provide a reason to follow simple rules, in general one
cannot conclude that rules dominate standards or that simplicity dominates complexity for all or even most purposes. In the field of contracts
in particular, Eric Posner has defended a more balanced view of formal
and substantive approaches to interpretation, suggesting that under some
circumstances-especially those in which the contracting parties are
boundedly rational, endowed with asymmetric information, or following
a suboptimal convention-courts can improve social welfare by pursuing

27. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 261-64; Scott, A Relational Theory of Default
Rules for Commercial Contracts, supra note 21, at 614.
28. See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 New Palgrave Dictionary, supra
note 21, at 277, 280; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271, 316-18 (1992); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J.
541 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory]; Robert E. Scott, The Case for
Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 864-65 (2000); Robert E. Scott, A
Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Colum. L. Rev 1641 (2003).
29. See Kaplow, Optimal Complexity, supra note 24, at 150.
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a liberal interpretive approach." Posner has also pointed out that even
were we to make the extreme assumption that courts were completely
unable to determine the contracting parties' intentions or the underlying
facts of a contractual dispute, it would still not necessarily follow that
courts should take a passive or literal approach to interpretation. Under
some circumstances, he suggests, even incompetent courts could promote cooperation and deter opportunism by providing a means whereby
an aggrieved party could credibly invoke a mutual penalty. Increasing
the complexity of legal proceedings, on this view, serves to increase the
size of this threat, even if it does little to improve the accuracy of the
31
result in those cases that actually go to trial.
This new economic analysis of formalism has been relatively successful in clarifying the traditional debates over formalism, and in relating
them to specific transactional and institutional problems such as imperfect information, risk allocation, rent-seeking, and bounded rationality.
Where the recent commentary has fallen short, however, is along the dimension of advancing toward practical responses to the form/substance
dilemma.
This is so for two reasons. First, because the difference between the
formalist and antiformalist positions is a matter of degree rather than
kind, resolving their arguments comes down in practice to line-drawing.
Even ardent neoformalists like Bernstein or Scott would agree that courts
should depart from formalist methodology in certain circumstances-for
instance, when there has been a credible allegation of fraud or error in
transcription. (Just as courts following the relatively formalist FirstRestatement version of the parol evidence rule made exception for cases of fraud
and mistake. 32 ) Conversely, even advocates of a more liberal interpretive
approach would acknowledge that their position demands that courts or
other law-applying actors possess at least minimal interpretive competence. But the proper compromise between form and substance, if it is to
be based on utilitarian considerations, depends on an empirical judgment, made over the universe of potential cases, of how the relevant informational and transactional factors balance out. The very limitations of
rationality and information that lead neoformalists to conclude that
courts should not engage in substantive interpretation and that legislatures should not enact vague standards that require a substantive application also prevent us from drawing the proper limits between formal and
substantive approaches with any confidence. To put it conversely, if state
30. See Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and
Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 91, 92 (2000); E.
Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 23, at 534.
31. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial
Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 749, 767-69 (2000) [hereinafter E. Posner, Radical Judicial
Error].
32. See cases surveyed in 2 E. Alan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.5 (2d ed.
1998).
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actors know enough to set the appropriate boundaries on formalism, they
are already significantly along the way to being able to do away with formalism entirely. Absent such knowledge, the setting of boundaries-like
the application of substantive interpretation in any given case-is a matter of guesswork.
Second, as Schwartz and Scott have shown in their influential work
on the political economy of the American Law Institute (and scholars in
the field of positive political theory have shown generally), legislative bodies that are charged with the promulgation of generally applicable regulations and that are also institutionally responsible to a diverse set of interest groups will tend to favor standards over rules and vagueness over
simplicity. 33 The positive imperatives of lawmaking thus lead naturally to
interpretive conventions that disfavor formalist decisionmaking. This
phenomenon may be somewhat less pronounced for common law courts,
perhaps due to the influence of interjurisdictional competition and litigant initiative, but even so the process of common law development, with
its continual generation of exceptions and counterprinciples, can erode
the clarity and simplicity of legal doctrine. In a federalist legal system in
which the choice between formal and substantive approaches can be
made at a local level, furthermore, different jurisdictions may adopt different interpretive stances for reasons of their own.
B. An Alternate Perspective: Private Ordering over Form and Substance
Given that new economic analysis of formalism does not offer clear
policy prescriptions for governmental reformers, or an operational program for implementing such prescriptions, what is the next move? In this
Essay, I propose a different approach: one that focuses on private legal
decisionmakers as the primary audience, rather than public ones. Note
in this regard that virtually all of the above-mentioned commentators direct the bulk of their advice to governmental or quasi-governmental officials, even-indeed, especially-neoformalists like Schwartz and Scott.
The advice may be that state actors should keep their hands off private
contractual arrangements and restrict themselves to the relatively
mechanical task of applying formal rules, but it is advice to state actors
nonetheless. There are some exceptions to this blanket statement: Bernstein, for instance, in her articles on private commercial law regimes, focuses in her explicit discussions on a largely positive analysis, and is content to leave her normative critique of the U.C.C.'s interpretive approach
as implicit. Posner also spends a significant amount of time in his articles
discussing the likely responses of private actors to the various interpretive
policies that courts and legislatures might adopt. 34 But this discussionwhich he calls a positive analysis rather than a normative one-operates
33. Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 16, at 597.
34. See generally Eggleston et al., supra note 30 (outlining the ways in which various
types of parties might respond to various interpretive regimes).
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in the overall context of his analysis merely as an instrument that he uses
to develop guiding principles for government lawmakers. He does not
consider, except incidentally, the possibility that his analysis could be use35
ful to private actors.
As I have argued elsewhere, the almost exclusive focus in the mainstream law-and-economics literature on a hypothetical audience of public
lawmakers constitutes a severe misallocation of intellectual resources. 36
Even if we thought the relevant officials were inclined to take our advice,
and even if we thought they had sufficient ability and incentive to apply
that advice fruitfully to actual policy and legal questions, we would still be
ignoring the entire population of potential private lawmakers and
neglecting the possibility that their efforts could also contribute to an
increase in social welfare. Unless one thinks that private incentives for
lawmaking are necessarily at odds with the public interest, or that private
lawmakers' theoretical and practical knowledge already provides them
with a fully adequate basis for enlightened lawmaking-or, more threateningly to our scholarly self-esteem, that private lawmakers would be even
less inclined to pay attention to our writings than public ones-this failure to address their perspective does not make economic sense. It seems
unlikely that an additional contracts article addressed to courts or legislators, on top of all such articles that have been written and published over
the past decades, would have higher value added than an article or two
focused on basic principles of transactional efficiency, and directed toward a hypothetical audience of private contract lawyers. 37 Moreover, the
detailed information that is necessary to implement these principles intelligently is much likelier to be available at the individual level than at the
level of the system as a whole. Private lawmakers may thus be in a significantly better position to make practical use of the economic analysis of
contracts than public ones.
The value of refocusing attention on planning problems faced by
private lawmakers, I think, is even greater with regard to basic problems
of interpretation of the sort studied in the first-year contracts class. Most
of the scholarly literature in the area is court- and case-centered, and thus
tends to emphasize the aspects of interpretation that are central to the
subjective experience of courts when deciding disputes. But as we know,
many more contracts are written than are litigated, and the majority of
our students that practice contract or commercial law will practice on the
transactional side. Few of them will be judges or legislators, most of them
35. Id. at 131-32 (observing, as an aside, that heterogeneity among contracting
parties implies that they should be permitted the freedom to choose ex ante between
formal and substantive interpretive regimes of law).
36. Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1745, 1748
(1996).
37. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239, 249-313 (1984) (analyzing and defending the transactional value
of business lawyers and their activities).
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will never be in a position to persuade a judge or legislature to change
the law, but all of them might benefit from a clearer understanding of the
practical consequences of formal and substantive interpretive strategies.
Taking a transactional approach to the problem of form and substance also helps emphasize the fact that, for all the discretion that courts
and other arbiters may have with regard to interpretive questions, there
are things that contracting parties can do ex ante to increase the chances
that interpreting actors will follow the contractors' wishes ex post. For
instance, if the parties want to limit courts' investigations into the history
of their negotiations, they can and often do put a merger clause into
their written contract, stating that the writing expresses their entire agreement and that all prior understandings or agreements have been merged
into it. Such a clause will not serve as an absolute guarantee that the
agreement will be enforced as written, but it does make a difference.
While courts still retain the power to ignore merger clauses if they conclude that circumstances warrant, the use of the clause still tends as a
practical matter to discourage courts from engaging in more free-form
styles of interpretation, which is why contracting parties continue to use
them even injurisdictions that take a liberal approach to the admission of
parol evidence.
There are, in fact, many opportunities for contracting parties to
choose between relatively formal and relatively substantive interpretive
regimes, and to have their choices matter; the merger clause is just one
prominent example. No-oral-modification clauses provide another: Parties to sales transactions can provide, pursuant to U.C.C. section 2-209,
that any modifications to their contract must be in writing. While such
clauses do not prevent courts from using the equitable doctrines of
waiver or estoppel to find that the contract has been varied, they still
reduce the likelihood of such a finding, and it is possible to add additional clauses to the original writing that discourage the assertion of such
claims. (Similarly, while the common law of contracts does not recognize
no-oral-modification clauses as an official formal device, the presence of
such a clause certainly raises the bar of persuasion for anyone who subsequently tries to claim that a contract has been so modified.)
Another common way for the parties to choose among interpretive
regimes is by choosing which jurisdiction's laws govern the contract, since
jurisdictions can vary considerably in their level of formalism. Virginia
and Texas, for instance, continue to follow a traditionally strict version of
the parol evidence rule, while California and New Jersey are widely
known to take more liberal approaches. 38 New York and Connecticut
continue to take different positions with regard to the formal effectiveness of an accord and satisfaction executed by check, even though the
38. For a survey of case law comparing common-law jurisdictions taking liberal and
strict approaches to the parol evidence rule, see Scott, The Uniformity Norm, supra note 7,
at 167-69.
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question is ostensibly governed by a uniform statute. 39 In the area of
international sales, the U.C.C., however antiformalist it may seem when
compared to the traditional common law, is in many ways more formal
than the alternative regime provided by the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which rejects both the
Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. 40 Choice-of-law clauses are
common in commercial contracts, and while policy considerations such
as consumer protection place some limits on their enforcement, at least
41
in the commercial setting they are usually implemented as written.
While there are many reasons for the parties to choose to be governed by
a given legal regime, procedural simplicity and the ease of resolving disputes is a common motivation, and in that regard the level of formalism
is an important factor.
Similarly, parties can often specify the forum in which contractual
disputes will be heard, either by specifying a particular location where any
litigation must be brought, or, as is increasingly common, by providing ex
ante for private arbitration. Even if the substantive law to be applied to
the contract is ostensibly the same, tribunals in different locations may be
more or less inclined to delve into contextual matters, due to differences
in jurisprudential approach, local legal culture, procedural and evidentiary rules, case loads, or other resource constraints. Private arbitrators
are subject to similar variations, and face further incentives to formalize
their interpretive practices in order to lower the cost of their proceedings, guard against suspicions of partiality, limit their exposure to judicial
42
supervision, and attract future business.
39. Compare Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 488 N.E.2d 56,
57-58 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that the common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction has
been superceded by provisions of U.C.C. section 1-207), with County Fire Door Corp. v.
C.F. Wooding Co., 520 A.2d 1028, 1031 (Conn. 1987) (holding that section 1-207 does not
apply to accord and satisfaction). The subsequent revision of section 1-207 adopted the
Connecticut approach, but New York, in contrast to most other states, has not adopted this
revision.
40. On the other hand, in the area of offer and acceptance, the CISG's rules are more
formalistic than the U.C.C.'s. Compare U.C.C. § 2-204, which indicates that a contract for
sale of goods can be made in "any manner sufficient to show agreement," and § 2-206,
where "an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner
and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances," with Articles 14 through 24 of the
CISG (creating elaborate framework of rules relating to offers, acceptances, counteroffers,
rejections, and retractions).
41. See Erin Ann O'Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of
Contractual Choice of Law, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1551, 1555-63 (2000) (discussing the use of
choice-of-law clauses and observing that courts "routinely enforce them").
42. Compare Bernstein, supra note 26, at 1725 (discussing how low-cost private legal
system is broadly regarded within the cotton industry as creating value), with Andrew T.
Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 Duke LJ.
1279, 1307 (2000) (emphasizing difficulty that courts face in ensuring that arbitrators
apply substantive legal rules in the same way that courts would), and Stephen J. Ware,
Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 Minn. L.
Rev. 703, 719-23 (1999) (same).
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Like choice-of-law clauses, forum-selection and arbitration clauses
are not always enforced strictly according to their terms, and may be disregarded by courts willing to look beyond the face of the clause for interpretive evidence, or to override the clause in favor of some countervailing
policy or principle. 43 But such clauses do receive some weight in practice; many courts enforce them presumptively, and there are self-interested reasons for even antiformalist courts to defer to them. Parties who
favor a more formal interpretive approach, accordingly, have significant
leeway to choose to have their disputes heard by tribunals who share their
philosophy (as Bernstein's discussions of private trade tribunals suggest).
Contracting parties may also opt into a formalist interpretive regime
by using a stereotypical legal device such as a negotiable instrument or
letter of credit. Such commercial specialties are governed by distinct
bodies of law, descending in part from the law merchant, that reflect a
more formalist jurisprudential philosophy than does the common law of
contracts generally. A holder in due course of a negotiable instrument,
for instance, is entitled to enforce the instrument against its maker or
endorser even if the defendant would have a good defense to liability on
the underlying contractual obligation. 44 Similarly, the liability of the issuer of a letter of credit depends solely on whether the beneficiary
presents documents that comply facially with the payment conditions provided in the letter. The issuer need not (and indeed, is not authorized
to) inquire into the truth of any representations contained in the presenting documents and is entitled to demand strict compliance with all payment conditions-in marked contrast to the more liberal rule of substantial compliance that would be imposed under the ordinary law of
contracts. 45 While commercial parties may have a variety of reasons for
choosing to use one of these specialized devices, one important reason is
the desire to contract into a more formalistic interpretive regime. A
prominent illustration is provided by the rise in popularity of the standby
letter of credit, which in economic terms is a close substitute for the common law suretyship or guaranty, but which in legal terms is governed by a

43. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding employee arbitration clause unconscionable); William J. Woodward, Jr.,
Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L.
Rev. 697, 780-83 (2001) (describing so-called "bomb shelter" legislation adopted by states
seeking to invalidate choice-of-law clauses that purport to apply the controversial Uniform
Computer Information and Transactions Act to transactions involving their residents).
44. U.C.C. § 3-305(b). The holder in due course's rights are subject to the so-called
"real" defenses, which include infancy, duress, illegality, lack of capacity, discharge in
bankruptcy, or essential fraud, but not subject to ordinary defenses such as mistake,
misrepresentation, or failure of condition. Id. § 3-305 cmt. 2.
45. Compare U.C.C. § 5-108 (detailing terms of strict compliance to issuer's
conditions), with Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 10, § 241 cmt. a
(explaining that the question of whether a party's failure to perform is material "turns on a
standard of materiality that is necessarily imprecise and flexible").
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substantially more formalistic body of legal doctrine. 46 Experts in the
that makes the standby
field commonly assert that it is this very formalism
47
credit an attractive commercial alternative.
Finally, contracting parties can often implement a more formal interpretive regime with regard to particular aspects of their agreement
through the use of specific stipulations. The most familiar case of such a
stipulation is the standard liquidated damage clause. By liquidating damages in their initial agreement, parties reduce the likelihood that a court
will engage in a substantive inquiry into the actual state of damages ex
post. A reduced likelihood is not a guarantee, of course, since courts will
still supervise a liquidated damages clause to ensure that it does not work
a penalty, and some courts remain resistant to the use of liquidated damages in cases where damages are amenable to ex post calculation. But by
adopting such a clause, the parties do buy themselves somewhat greater
48
formality, and in practice perhaps a presumption of enforceability.
Similar stipulations regarding other terms of the agreement have an anal49
ogous effect.
Because there are so many ways for contracting parties to influence
the interpretive regime under which their agreements will be enforced,
the existing literature's emphasis on advising public lawmakers whether
to restrict or liberalize their interpretive approach is to a significant extent beside the point. The interpretive regime should be understood as a
sort of default rule, which parties can opt out of with careful planning.
Different parties, depending on their circumstances, will prefer different
46. See Peter A. Alces, An Essay on Independence, Interdependence, and the
Suretyship Principle, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 447, 465-76 (discussing and comparing defenses
under Article 5 and the common law). For specific examples, consider U.C.C. § 5102(a) (7) (defining good faith as mere "honesty in fact," in contrast to the more equitable
standard of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" found in § 2-103(1)(b)),
§ 5-108(a) (substituting a strict compliance principle for doctrines of waiver and estoppel
that would otherwise apply under § 1-103), § 5-111 (a) (eliminating consequential damages
and, more strikingly, the duty t( mitigate damages), and § 5-111 (e) (providing that courts
must award attorneys' fees to prevailing party in any dispute that arises over issuer's duty to
pay).
47. See Alces, supra note 46, at 450-52; Henry Harfield, Guaranties, Standby Letters
of Credit, and Ugly Ducklings, 26 UCC L.J. 195, 196 n.2 (1994); Rufus James Trimble, The
Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 981, 1006 (1948).
48. For a list of suggestions to drafters of liquidated damage clauses seeking to
maximize the chances of enforcement, see 3 Farnsworth, supra note 32, § 12.18a
(recommending, inter alia, avoiding the word "penalty," allowing damages to vary with the
amount of delay or quantity of defective goods, reciting the types of loss that are intended
to be compensated, and arranging for deposits or bonuses as an alternative enforcement
device).
49. See, for example, U.C.C. § 1-102(3), which provides that although duties of good
faith, reasonableness, diligence, and care cannot be disclaimed entirely, the parties can by
stipulation determine the standards by which those duties are to be measured, so long as
"such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." The upshot is that courts retain the
power to supervise the parties' stipulations, but parties can, through careful planning,
make it less likely that their choices will be second-guessed in practice.
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tradeoffs between form and substance, and helping the parties to choose
the correct balance in this regard is one of the main tasks the transactional lawyer faces. Judicial formalism may wax and wane, but this planning problem will remain important for lawyers and for their clients.
What is needed, accordingly, and what the economic analysis of contracts can provide, is a basic taxonomy of substantive considerations that
can serve as an organizing framework for parties choosing between form
and substance when designing contracts. A good commercial lawyer
needs to understand the functional underpinnings of the transaction in
order to help plan it-and in commercial settings, these underpinnings
are economic. I am not claiming that actual transactional attorneys do
not already take such considerations into account-of course they do; a
working familiarity with such factors is one of their main stocks in trade.
But organizing such insights into a more systematic conceptual framework helps us to integrate and synthesize disparate bodies of practical
knowledge relating to various commercial and legal fields: negotiable instruments, letters of credit, choice of law, sales, and so on. Such a synthesis enables insights from one field to be translated and analogized for the
purposes of critiquing and improving transactional planning in others.
Additionally, it serves an important pedagogical function in the training
of law students, because young lawyers beginning legal practice will be
able to assimilate conventional wisdom more quickly and effectively if
they are first equipped with its implicit theoretical underpinnings.
In the succeeding sections of this Essay, therefore, I turn to the question of when and why contracting parties should choose formal methods
of interpretation over substantive ones, or vice versa. My analysis thus will
implicate questions such as whether the parties should write a merger
clause into their agreement or whether the parties should opt into Virginia law, rather than questions such as whether a court should admit a
given item of parol evidence, or change its doctrines so as more closely to
resemble Virginia law. Of course, if we are able to develop a framework
for answering the former set of questions, that will likely help courts to
answer the latter set of questions as well, and possibly to ask those questions differently. Instead of asking what substantive terms the parties intended to have in their agreement, courts might begin to ask what interpretative method the parties wished to have.
II. A

MODEL OF THE CHOICE BETWEEN FoRm

AND SUBSTANCE

A. Normative Considerations
In this section, I set out my operational definitions of form and substance in the interpretive context, as well as the normative goals that my
framework is designed to pursue. The latter question is more quickly
addressed. This Essay is intended to follow in the tradition of functional-

2004] FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

513

50
ist accounts of formalism such as the one put forward by Lon Fuller.
But because I am focusing on those functional considerations that are
most relevant to decisionmaking by contracting parties at the planning
stage, my analysis is limited almost exclusively to issues of economic efficiency. Specifically, I concentrate on the question of what administrative
arrangements will maximize the total expected value of the underlying
exchange, with adjustments for risk aversion but not for distribution or
procedural fairness (except insofar as the parties are willing to sacrifice
exchange value in order to promote such other goals).
I defend this focus on the pragmatic grounds of brevity and specialization of scholarly effort, which are standard in the economic literature
on contracts. The normative appeal of the efficiency criterion has been
thoroughly discussed by other scholars (indeed, there has been a recent
resurgence of debate over the criterion) and I have nothing to add to this
discussion at present. Justifying the efficiency criterion as a matter of fundamental principle is beyond the scope of this Essay, and the usual admonitions will apply. 5 1 Second, this Essay attempts in particular to develop
general principles that can be used to further the aims of private contracting parties. Such parties, especially those operating in the commercial context, generally engage in exchange for instrumental purposes that
typically include the goal of material profit. Any analysis that did not give
a central place to maximizing contractual value would not address these
needs. Third, as long as the transaction in question is an arms-length
one, the parties have the option not to enter into it, and they are informed of the relevant business risks and legal consequences, there are
no clear distributional consequences flowing from any change in legal
rules. 52 As a general matter, the surplus from exchange tends to be divided among contracting parties in proportion to their relative eagerness
to enter into the bargain. Any efficiency gains or losses resulting from a
53
change in regime, accordingly, will tend to be shared.

50. See Fuller, supra note 5.
51. For general discussion of the efficiency criterion, see Jules L. Coleman, Markets,
Morals and the Law 95-112 (1988); Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 48-115
(1981); see also Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485-770
(1980). More specifically, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that even if
distributional equity is an important social objective, it is more effectively promoted by
using direct public instruments such as tax and transfer payments, rather than by use of
the rules of private law. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23J. Legal Stud. 667, 669 (1994).
52. One exception to this general statement is the doctrine of silence as acceptance.
See Avery Katz, Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Contract Formation: When
Should Silence in the Face of an Offer be Construed as Acceptance?, 9 J.L. Econ. & Org.
77 (1993) (construing silence as acceptance raises the cost of declining an exchange,
shifting value from the offeree to the offeror).
53. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361, 365-66 (1991) (explaining
why, in general, any legal regime change will result in sharing of benefits between
consumers and producers).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:496

In the bulk of this Essay, furthermore, I also treat the interests of the
contracting parties as paramount. This approach is equivalent to assuming that there are no important third-party effects attaching to the principal parties' decisions. If there are such third-party effects, then we can
stipulate that from an efficiency standpoint courts and other public officials ought to watch out for them, and ought to refuse to give effect to
any contractual provisions-including those that deal with the form/substance issue-that impose negative externalities. Similarly, a complete
analysis of any policy issue in contract or commercial law would obviously
have to include consideration of potential market and contractual failures (such as monopoly power, bounded rationality, and imperfect information) that would justify overriding the parties' contractual freedom,
but in this Essay I will put aside such problems, for reasons generally anal54
ogous to those I have given above for ignoring issues of distribution.
It is worth making one last prefatory remark regarding the relevance
to my analysis of the liberal norm of personal autonomy. Some contracts
scholars, including Randy Barnett, have argued in favor of formalist
modes of interpretation on grounds of autonomy, reasoning that clear
and predictable rules help to facilitate the free exercise of individual will
and operate as a safeguard against state agents illegitimately infringing on
individual choice. 55 Other autonomy theorists, such as Charles Fried,
have instead claimed that deference to parties' freely exercised choices
may sometimes require courts to pay closer substantive attention to what
choices the parties actually intended to exercise. 5 6 I take no position on
this controversy, and indeed have little to say about autonomy. It does
seem to me, however, that a principled liberal should be in favor of allowing people entering into contracts to choose between formal and substantive modes of contractual interpretation, based on what seem to them
to be good and sufficient reasons, unless there is some reason such as
force or fraud that justifies overriding the parties' will. In this regard, my
goals here are consistent with those of a liberal or libertarian, in that I
focus on clarifying the considerations that would be relevant to such a
choice in the individual case. Parties are more likely to have their contractual decisions respected when they have engaged in well-considered

54. For an excellent (and perhaps definitive) general discussion of such problems, see
generally Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993).
55. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 291-319
(1986); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent,
78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 857-60 (1992); cf. Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The
Reason of Rules 19-23 (1985) (grounding contractarian philosophical perspective in
premise that individuals are "ultimate sources of value and of valuation").
56. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 57-73, 85-91 (1981) (pointing to
interpretative moments where courts must presume intent of parties and perform a gapfilling role).
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deliberations, and so to the extent that my analysis fosters better private
57
decisionmaking, it also forwards liberal values.
B. A Descriptive Model
With these normative preliminaries out of the way, we are now in a
position to turn to the main analysis. There are numerous accounts of
58
the distinction between form and substance in the scholarly literature.
One sees the dichotomy expressed in terms of rules versus standards,
rules versus discretion, textual versus contextual modes of interpretation,
static versus dynamic interpretation, simplicity versus complexity, determinacy versus flexibility, objective versus subjective standards, and so on.
Each of these opposed pairs highlights different functional aspects of the
formalism problem, but what they have in common is that the first member of each opposed pair connotes an interpretive approach that focuses
on a more limited set of authoritative or evidentiary materials, and the
second member connotes an approach that embraces or allows for the
consideration of a more expansive set of materials. A rule-based theory of
interpretation, for instance, directs the interpreter to limit his or her attention to the specific considerations set out by the lawmaker at the time
that the rule was promulgated, while a standard-based theory also allows
the interpreter to consider factors that may not become apparent until
the moment that law is applied to facts. 59 Similarly, an objective standard
of interpretation directs the interpreter to limit attention to factors that
would be accessible to all individuals who can be categorized as being in
the relevant agent's position (with the category being defined widely or
narrowly depending on the prescriptions of the standard), while a subjective interpretive standard directs the interpreter additionally to consider
factors that might be accessible only to the individual parties to the
60
contract.
57. Compare in this regard the normative tradition of corrective justice, which in
some of its versions might be thought to suggest that moral or legal wrongs need to be
substantively righted regardless of the wishes and intentions of the victim, and that this
obligation is inalienable. While my efficiency-oriented approach is compatible and even
consonant with the autonomy norm, it conflicts with the corrective justice approach to this
extent. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (2002)
(contrasting their welfare-based approach to normative theories that evaluate actions or
policies as right or wrong without regard to the consequentialist effect on individuals).
58. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 109, 174-204
(1994); Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules 207-32 (1991); Kaplow, Rules, supra note
24, at 618-20; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law,
40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1175, 1177 (1989); Grey, The New Formalism, supra note 15, at 19-21.
59. See, e.g., Kaplow, Rules, supra note 24.
60. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 10, §§ 20, 201
(contrasting objective and subjective interpretive standards, as well as standards
emphasizing the alternative interpretive positions of speaker and listener).
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Following this general distinction, accordingly, in this Essay I will
model the concept of formality as a function of the set of materials that
an interpreter considers in arriving at an interpretation. Formalism entails restriction to a smaller set of decisional materials (for example, the
presence or absence of a wax seal, as it relates to the enforceability of a
written promise); while substantive interpretation permits and sometimes
directs attention to a larger set of decisional materials (for example, the
underlying facts of a business relationship, as they relate to the presence
or absence of contractual consideration). I am hoping that this account
of formalism will seem both intuitively appealing and familiar; it resembles and draws on, for instance, the concept of exclusionary reasons put
forward byjurisprudential writers such as Raz and Schauer. 6 ' In order to
highlight the connection of my approach with economic analysis in general and decision theory in particular, however, I denote the set of permissible materials associated with a given interpretive regime as the regime's information set, and model the parties' choice between formal and
substantive regimes as an ex ante choice of the information set L
Note that this definition of formalism can itself fairly be called formalistic, since it suppresses other factors that some people might consider relevant to an account of the distinction between form and substance. The definition can be interpreted quite generally, however, to
include most of the issues discussed under the rubric of formalism by
traditional scholars ofjurisprudence. For instance, according to this definition, both traditional legal positivism, which distinguishes between
moral and legal considerations and claims that only the latter provide an
appropriate basis for legal decisionmaking, and Ronald Dworkin's contemporary theory ofjudging, which distinguishes between considerations
of policy and of principle and claims that only the latter provide an ap62
propriate basis for judicial decisionmaking, are formalist theories.
On such a definition, it is not strictly possible to rank all interpretive
regimes in order of their formality, since the information sets associated
with two regimes may overlap. For instance, U.C.C. section 2-202 directs
courts interpreting an integrated contract to consider trade usage, course
of dealing, and course of performance in interpreting the meaning of the
contract, but not to consider evidence of prior agreements or contemporaneous oral agreements to the extent that they are inconsistent with the
written contract terms. 63 The standard for determining inconsistency,
64
however, is not prescribed, and many courts have applied it liberally.
61. SeeJoseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 19-33 (1979);
Schauer, supra note 58, at 88-93.
62. On positivism and its relation to Dworkin's.theory of judging, see generally Jules
Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1982).
63. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2000).
64. This liberal interpretation reflects the spirit of official comment 3 of section 2-202,
which appears to suggest a presumption of consistency: "If the additional terms are such
that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document in the view
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This approach is in contrast with the traditional common law, which took
a stricter stand on the admission of parol evidence and did not explicitly
confer official status on course of performance. In this regard, the
U.C.C. is less formal. But section 2-209(2) also provides that if the parties
to a signed contract adopt a no-oral-modification clause, attempted oral
modifications will be ineffective. 65 This device was not recognized at
common law, and in this regard the U.C.C. is more formal. Thus, if we
are being absolutely precise, only if the information set associated with a
given regime is entirely contained within the information set of another
regime (i.e., the first information set is a proper subset of the second)
can we say that the first regime is strictly more formal than the second.
But speaking more casually, it will be useful to call a regime relatively
formal if its information set is relatively more restricted than another's, or
if its information set contains relatively little that is not contained within
the other information set, and omits a significant amount of material that
is contained within the other information set.
While the set-theoretic definition I have given may appear to suggest
a bright-line distinction between formal and substantive modes of interpretation, it can also be understood in probabilistic terms. Some regimes-indeed, probably most-may admit certain types of material into
their permissible information sets, but only some of the time, or only for
limited purposes, or with less weight, or only if the material is weighty
enough to overcome a presumption against admissibility. Accordingly, a
regime that allows the consideration of more interpretive material more
of the time or with greater probability is more formalistic, other things
being equal, than a regime that uses such material less of the time or with
lower probability. Similarly, a regime that establishes a hierarchy of influence and that treats certain types of material as more weighty or more
privileged than others is more formalistic than one that accords all types
of material equal consideration. To illustrate, under the Second Restatement's approach to the parol evidence rule, the court may consider parol
evidence for the purpose of deciding whether the written contract is an
integrated one or not. If the court decides on the basis of the evidence
that the writing is an integration, then the parol evidence is not supposed
to be used to interpret the writing further, and must be withheld from
the trier of fact. 6 6 Similarly, under U.C.C. sections 1-205 and 2-208,
factfinders are directed to interpret trade usage, course of dealing, course
of performance, and express contractual terms as consistent with one another if they can reasonably bear such a reading. If they cannot, express
terms are to take precedence over the other categories of material,
of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact."
U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
65. Under section 2-209(4), however, attempts at modification may nevertheless
operate as a waiver under certain circumstances.
66. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 10, § 209.
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course of performance is to take precedence over trade usage and course
of dealing, and course of dealing is to take precedence over trade usage.
It is important to note that the information set associated with a
given interpretive regime is not the same thing as the information set that
is actually used by any particular interpretive agent within that regime
when making an interpretive determination-and similarly, that this latter information set I. (call it the agent-specific information set for individual
agent a) may vary among agents within the same regime. In this case, the
effective formality of a regime will depend on the distribution of information sets across all agents within it, and as such must be understood in
statistical terms.
For example, a given regime might permit individual judges to make
use of their experience in previous cases when making an interpretive
decision, or might allow courts to take judicial notice of particular facts.
Under that regime, judges with different backgrounds or levels of experience would have different agent-specific information sets available when
making their decisions. A regime that prohibited judges from considering this sort of background information would make their individual
agent-specific information sets more similar. If we compare the information available to judges to the information available to contracting parties, however, a ban on judicial notice could make the expected information
set, as averaged over the set of alljudges, either more or less similar to the
expected information set, as averaged over the set of all contracting parties. The direction of the outcome would then depend on how much the
experience of judges overlapped with the experience of contracting
parties.
In sum, the effective degree of formalism achieved by the regime
should be understood as a function of its agent-specific information sets,
each of which are themselves functions of the regime's general information set, as chosen by the parties or by default rules of contract
interpretation.
Note that the expected outcome depends not only on the distribution of agent types, but also on the specific way in which individual agents
combine their own agent-specific set I with the information specified in
the contractual set L For instance, we could imagine that some agents
might simply combine all of their agent-specific information with the contractual information set I, using both types of information with equal
weight; alternatively, some agents might base their interpretations only
on information that appears both within their personal information set as
well as in the contractually-specified set. Similarly, one could imagine
that agents also vary in the ultimate decision rule they apply after engaging in an interpretation (so that, for instance, some agents could pursue
what they saw as the parties' intentions, others could pursue what they
saw as economic efficiency, and still others what they saw as distributional
justice). The above specification, accordingly, is general enough to encompass various types of interpretive approaches and agency problems.
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This discussion implies, therefore, that the parties' optimal choice of the
contractual information set Iwill thus depend on how agents make use of
that information, and thus on particular features of the legal regime and
67
on the identities of the interpretive agents.
The foregoing remarks also imply that within this theoretical framework, contracting parties can opt into a more formal interpretive regime
in two ways: first, by placing limits on the overall information set permitted by the regime (for example, by excluding parol evidence or evidence
of oral modifications), and second, by limiting the set of eligible interpretive agents (for example, with a choice-of-forum or arbitration clause).
They could also combine these methods, by specifying different information sets for different types of interpreters-for example, one interpretative regime could be used when the contract is interpreted by the parties
themselves, another regime when interpreted by fellow traders, yet another when interpreted by arbitrators, another when interpreted by
courts. Thus it would be possible, if the law allowed and the parties so
wished, to use a relatively standard-based approach when applying nonlegal sanctions among the parties and their trading community, and a rela68
tively formalistic approach when litigating in the public courts.
C. The Contextualist Argument
This way of framing the problem helps to clarify and rebut a common argument against using formal methods of interpretation, to the effect that all interpretation depends upon a common basis of contextual
knowledge between speaker and audience and that formalism mistakenly
supposes that this is not the case. The argument typically goes as follows:
As a matter of social practice, words have no fixed or plain meaning, and
communications are not self-executing. A tribunal faced with a communicative text of potentially legal significance must always make a contextual interpretation, based on its experience, on its stereotypes about parties such as these and their likely purposes, and on the linguistic
conventions it regularly participates in and in which it thinks the parties
67. For mathematically-inclined readers, it is useful to represent the foregoing
conceptual model in formal notation as follows: First, each interpretive agent combines
her agent-specific information set I. with the contractual information set I, using a
particular aggregation function G (I, I.). Second, the agent applies some decision rule
D(e) to the resulting aggregated information. Third, this same process is carried out by all
types of agents, so that the ex ante expected outcome from the viewpoint of the
contracting parties can be written as:
f D (G (I, 1.)) f(a) da
where f(a) represents the probability distribution of agents of type a. As indicated in the
text, both the aggregation function G(e) and the decision rule D(9) may be agent-specific.
For example, some agents may combine their personal information with the contractually
specified information using the union function u (1, I.), while other more skeptical agents
may use the more restrictive intersection function n (I, Ia).
68. Indeed, this is the very arrangement that Bernstein claims contracting commercial
parties will typically prefer. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 26, at 1739-45.
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participate. As the legal and literary critic Stanley Fish has put it, "A senA set
tence is never not in a context. We are never not in a situation ....
of interpretive assumptions is always in force. A sentence that seems to
need no interpretation is already the product of one. '69 Accordingly, if
the tribunal interprets a contract formally-that is, without fully inquiring into the actual context out of which it arose-there is no guarantee
that it will apply the contract as the parties subjectively intended. The
parties may have meant "chicken" to mean "broiler chicken," they may
have meant "minimum quantity" to mean "at buyer's option," they may
even have intended "buy" to mean "sell." One cannot know for sure without inquiring; if the court does not inquire, it is interpreting by its own
lights, not the parties'. The choice for the court, therefore, is not
whether to rely on context and substance, but which context and substance to rely on: the parties' or its own.
This argument-call it the contextualist argument-has been very influential in the contracts literature in the last fifty years; its advocates have
72
7
70
included such luminaries as Wigmore, Corbin, ' and Justice Traynor.
In its claim that all interpretation requires some context, it seems plainly
69. Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive
Communities 284 (1980).
70. "The fallacy [of plain meaning] consists in assuming that there is or ever can be
some one real or absolute meaning." 9 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence
§ 2462(1) (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
71. "[S]ome of the surrounding circumstances always must be known before the
meaning of the words can be plain and clear; and proof of the circumstances may make a
meaning plain and clear when in the absence of such proof some other meaning may also
have seemed plain and clear." 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 542 (1960)
(footnote omitted). Also note the Second Restatement's position on contextual meaning:
It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain meaning of a
writing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in a context. Accordingly,
the rule stated in Subsection (1) is not limited to cases where it is determined that
the language used is ambiguous. Any determination of meaning or ambiguity
should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence of the situation and
relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary
negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of
dealing between the parties.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra note 10, § 212, cmt. b.
72. A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written
instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to be clear and
unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or
presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not
attained.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968)
(Traynor, C.J.).
Words are used in an endless variety of contexts. Their meaning is not
subsequently attached to them by the reader but is formulated by the writer and
can only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that
reveal the sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of parol
evidence regarding such circumstances merely because the words do not appear
ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument
of a meaning that was never intended.
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right. Where the argument goes wrong, however, is in concluding that
this claim, together with the goal of carrying out the parties' intentions,
commits one to a substantive approach to interpretation; such a conclusion does not follow. As Eric Posner has observed, the argument neglects
the possibility that the parties can have intentions regarding how their
73
intentions are to be interpreted.
Translated into the framework of our model, the contextualist argument simply states that interpretation is always carried out with reference
to a particular information set. A tribunal's information set is made up of
various elements, including the judges' experience and training, the text
of the contractual agreement, as well as any additional material presented
by the parties in litigation. Given its information set, the court can carry
out its interpretation with the goal of forwarding the intentions of the
parties, or it can pursue some other goal, such as forwarding its own view
of the best social policy. Whatever goal the court pursues, however, it
must make its best guess based on the information available to it (in the
way that courts knowingly make decisions based on limited information
when deciding a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the
pleadings). While the quality of the guess, accordingly, depends on the
available information set, which information set to use and which goal to
pursue are independent questions. A broad information set can be used
to pursue goals other than the fulfillment of the parties' intentions, and a
narrow information set can be used to pursue the parties' intentions,
however roughly.
This translation into information-theoretic language shows that not
only does the contextualist argument not prove that plain meaning is incoherent, it actually provides us with an operational definition of plain
meaning-and an economic one at that. Namely, for a given audience or
interpreter, plain meaning corresponds to the interpretation associated
with the interpreter's ordinary or zero-cost context-that is, the context
that the interpreter can apply with minimal work. Under more substantive interpretative doctrines, the tribunal deliberately seeks out an augmented context. Under more formalist interpretive doctrines, the tribunal deliberately restricts its context. Note that on this definition, what
meaning is plain will be agent-specific and context-specific. If I make a
pun or employ irony, for instance, my plain meaning will be one thing to
an audience that catches the irony and another to one that does not.
Note also that according to this definition, plain meaning is not the
most formalistic interpretive mode possible. The tribunal can ignore or
throw away information that is part of its ordinary context, as when a
court applying constitutional rules of criminal procedure deliberately excludes evidence that is the fruit of an illegal search or coerced confession.
Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. Press Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d 665, 679 (Cal. 1942) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
73. E. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 23, at 570-71.
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Because some effort is involved in the exclusion, however, it only makes
sense to do this if there is some cost associated with using the excluded
information.
The same analysis holds, by the way, for all types of interpretation. If
I plan to attend a Shakespearean play, for instance, I could read the play
in advance so as not to miss intricacies of language that would not otherwise be familiar to me, or I could just go unprepared and enjoy the play
as best as I can. If I do read the play in advance, I could buy the pocketbook version, which is cheaper and easier to carry around on the subway,
or I could at somewhat greater cost buy and read the annotated edition. I
could read the introductory essays in that edition, or not; I could go to
the library and read secondary literature or do historical research, or not;
I could even go to graduate school and get a Ph.D. in English. Assuming
I know of the existence of the annotated edition, the secondary literature,
and the available graduate programs, however, my choice is a deliberate
and informed one, influenced by the relative costs and benefits of the
alternatives.
Conversely, creators of communicative texts also make choices about
how much context to provide, and this choice is also influenced by the
costs and benefits. An author could spell out additional meaning in a
fuller and longer text. This will increase printing and shipping costs as
well as the time required for reading; it will also tend to reduce spontaneity and creative experience for the reader. Thus in literary (and especially poetic) communications this is not usually done, but it can be (consider T.S. Eliot's The Waste Land, with its extensive annotations). The
same is true in music, painting, arts, letters, and law. The decision
whether to provide more context, however, depends on purposes of the
interpretation-or, stated in economic terms, the marginal costs and
benefits of context.
The trick is to identify the relevant costs and benefits and how to
trade them off against each other. In the example of the Shakespearean
play, for instance, the tradeoff is relatively straightforward: more time
and effort versus a deeper enjoyment of the play. Furthermore, since
both the costs and benefits accrue to me personally, there is little reason
not to let me decide how I wish (putting aside paternalistic situations
such as high school English class). In cases where contracts and other
texts of legal significance are being interpreted, however, the problem is
more complicated, and the costs and benefits are more varied. For example, errors in determining whether or not one party owed another a legal
duty or whether such a duty was breached can undercut incentives to
comply with such duties. 74 Errors in determining the standard of care
implied by a legal duty, the amount of care that the parties actually took
74. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37
J.L. & Econ. 1, 10-14 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Accuracy) (examining the
social value, as measured by the principles of standard welfare economics, of reducing
errors of liability).
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in their particular case, or the damages resulting from a breach of duty
can encourage either inadequate or excessive caretaking. 75 In contractual settings, the parties are also interested in incentives for information
exchange and for investment in the relationship. To the extent that the
tradeoffs among these various considerations differ among contractual
and commercial settings, accordingly, different contracting parties might
have different preferences about how their agreements should be
interpreted.
A committed contextualist might offer an objection to the foregoing
approach, one that we can call the "bootstrapping" argument because it
suggests that any private interpretative direction by the parties depends
for its enforcement on a public and mandatory interpretative regime.
.Specifically, the contextualist would argue, while such tradeoffs might
well exist, it is not possible to determine what interpretative regime the
parties intended to choose without investigating the context in which
they contracted. Suppose for instance that a court is confronted with a
standard form contract that contains, as one of its printed terms, a standard merger or arbitration clause. The mere fact that the clause appears
as part of the printed text does not by itself imply that the parties agreed
to it; it could be a boilerplate or fine-print term to which no one attended, the result of fraud or force, and so on. In order to apply the
clause properly, the court must first decide whether it is part of the contract. In short, the court must make its own prior interpretation, and this
interpretation, in principle, cannot be the subject of the parties' choice.
The proper answer to the bootstrapping argument is that it is overstated. It is true that in order for the parties to choose a contractual
information set, they must find some way of communicating to their interpretative agent that they have done so. It is also true that an interpretative agent faced with an apparent contract must find some way of determining whether the item in question actually is a contract, and what
information set she is supposed to use to interpret it. But the interpretation that is required to make this threshold determination is rather more
limited and bounded than the interpretation that would be necessary to
establish all the parties' substantive rights and duties. It is possible to
separate out the specific question of interpretative approach and to determine that question in an initial and narrower inquiry; all formal regimes
of interpretation have managed to do that. The relatively formal version
of the parol evidence rule contained in the First Restatement of Contracts,
for example, admitted various doctrinal exceptions based on fraud, condition precedent, and the like. 76 These exceptions made the doctrine
more complicated, but they did not change the fact that the First Restate75. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279, 298-99 (1986); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Accuracy, supra note 74, at 192-93.
76. Restatement of Contracts § 238(b) (stating proof of fraud can be made out using
parol evidence); id. § 241 (stating oral condition precedent to effectiveness of contract is
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ment regime was relatively more formal than the Second Restatement regime
that succeeded it. Similarly, the law of negotiable instruments and of letters of credit admits various real defenses-duress, forgery, fraud in the
inducement-that can prevent a holder in due course from recovering
from the drawer, and to this extent, courts ruling on claims must make
contextual inquiries. 77 But these inquiries are rather more limited than
those that would be allowed in a full-blown suit on the underlying contract between drawer and drawee, and they do not undercut the relative
formality of these specialized legal regimes. Thus, it is possible and coherent for courts to follow relatively formal interpretative methods, and
for contracting parties to direct them to do so, even if there is some slippage in the process.
In summary, the problem of form versus substance in contract interpretation can be assimilated to the problem of optimal information acquisition. From an economic viewpoint, a fuller or broader context can
be purchased-but only at a cost of time and trouble, and of exacerbating certain incentive problems-so it pays to stop at some optimal point.
The next section of this Essay surveys the main types of considerations
that determine the costs and benefits of formalism, and thus the optimal
stopping point.
III.

CHOOSING BETWEEN

FoRm

AND SUBSTANCE

The standards for measuring contractual liability and damages for
breach influence contracting parties' behavior in many respects: with regard to decisions to breach, to take advance precautions, to mitigate damages, to gather and communicate information, to allocate risk, to make
reliance investments, to behave opportunistically, and to spend resources
in litigation, among others. The regime of contract interpretation, because it determines how liability and damages will be assessed ex post, has
similarly widespread incentive and efficiency effects. Accordingly, given
the purposes for which I am writing, it does not make sense to try to
develop a unitary theory for choosing between form and substance, since
the answer in any particular case will turn on a comparison of various
types of transaction costs. Instead, I will list and discuss the main categories of these transaction costs, with the hope that a systematic consideration of these issues will help individual parties address the formality problem in specific contexts.

binding if there is nothing in writing which is inconsistent therewith); id. § 240 (1932)
(stating oral promise enforceable if contained in collateral agreement).
77. See U.C.C. §§ 3-305(a)(1), 3-305(b) & cmt. 1 (2000) (noting, inter alia, that the
court must account for all relevant factors, "including the intelligence, education, business
experience, and ability to read or understand English of the signer" to determine whether
the signer satisfied the "excusable ignorance" test of the fraud defense).
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A. A Survey of Economic Criteria Relevant to the Choice
1. Direct Transaction Costs. - The most obvious consideration relevant to choosing an interpretive regime is the direct costs of writing contracts and litigating contractual disputes, and these costs can be affected
in various ways by formality. Other things being equal, an agent that bases its interpretive decisions on a smaller set of materials should require,
whether it is performing or enforcing a contract, less time and effort to
carry out its task. Thus, formal modes of interpretation will be appropriate whenever the ex post costs of time and effort are especially large-for
example, when time is of the essence or when the opportunity costs of
the enforcing or performing agent's time is high. Thus, in letter of credit
transactions, where the viability of the letter of credit as a payment device
depends on the speed and administrative efficiency with which payment
can be processed, formal methods of interpretation are favored. 78 Issuing banks are not supposed to look past the face of submitted documents
when determining whether documentary conditions have been satisfied,
and the rules for determining compliance with such conditions are strict.
Similarly, in markets where a high level of trust among the participants is
necessary to support cooperation with regard to the performance of
nonverifiable aspects of the contract, and where extended disputes can
undermine such trust, disputes can be kept short and relatively painless
through the application of more formal decision procedures.7 9
It should be recognized, however, that if the contracting parties anticipate that formal decision procedures will be applied at the performance or enforcement stage, they may be induced to put greater effort into
specifying additional considerations or supplying additional interpretive
materials at the contract-writing stage, in order to address some of the
issues that are discussed below, such as risk or performance incentives.
For example, the anticipation that issuing banks will not look beneath the
surface of any supporting documents when processing a letter of credit
may induce the issuer to provide a more elaborate set of documentary
conditions up front. (Conversely, the prospect that any such conditions
will be enforced strictly may induce parties to provide a less elaborate list
of requirements.)

78. See U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. I (noting important difference between formal letters of
credit and "secondary," "accessory," or "suretyship" guarantees); John F. Dolan, The Law of
Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits § 3.07 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 2d

ed. 1991) (detailing advantages of modern formal methods of interpretation with regard
to commercial credit); Boris Kozolchyk, The Financial Standby: A Summary Description of

Practice and Related Legal Problems, 28 UCC L.J. 327, 334-35, 358-59 (1996) ("The need
for a speedy and abstract payment . . . requires that the issuer . . . rely exclusively on
documentary terms and conditions.").

79. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 119-30 (1992) (describing trust
relations and dispute resolution procedures in the uncut diamonds market).
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If this effect is a significant one, then the cost of considering additional interpretive materials ex post needs to be weighed against the costs
of increased contract-writing costs ex ante.
2. Risk. - Variation in interpretive outcomes introduces risk into
the contractual relationship. Since contracting parties usually dislike risk
and are willing to expend resources to avoid it, they may choose between
form and substance as a risk management device. The choice will be different, however, for parties with different attitudes toward risk or different abilities to spread or diversify it. In the interpretive setting, outcome
risk derives from variations in the distribution of agent-specific information sets. A widely dispersed distribution of information sets means that
factfinders or performers will interpret the same materials differently. To
the extent that including additional interpretive material reduces this va80
riation, it will reduce the resultant interpretation risk.
For instance, suppose that judges vary in their background experience with regard to commercial matters. They will accordingly differ in
their reading of particular documents, or of legal standards such as reasonableness or good faith. If the judges are directed to inquire more
deeply into the commercial context before deciding on their interpretation, this inquiry will (at a cost) reduce variance by making the less experienced judges' information sets more closely resemble the more exper81
ienced judges' information sets.
The value of risk reduction may help to explain Lisa Bernstein's observation that industry tribunals tend to follow relatively formal regimes
of interpretation, even though their cost of inquiring into substance is
less than that of generalist judges.8 2 To the extent that the judges are
already expert in the subject of the contract, the variance among their
information sets is likely to be low. Thus, the marginal value of risk reduction that is purchased by the consideration of additional information
is likely to be smaller, and less likely to justify incurring the additional
costs. The fact that contracting parties in such settings prefer relatively
formal rules when litigating in front of expert tribunals, accordingly, does

80. The conclusion would depend on the precise functional form of the information

aggregation function G. For example, if G were the union function u (I, I.), increasing
the size of the contractual information set would reduce the variance of G. If G were the
intersection function n (I, Ia), conversely, increasing the size of the contractual
information set would have no effect on the variance of G.
81. One might speculate that differences in perspective will lead the experienced
judges to evaluate the new material differently, thus increasing the interpretive variance
rather than decreasing it, but such an outcome is unlikely so long as there are diminishing
returns to expertise, or so long as the variations in judges' evaluation of individual items of
interpretive material are less than fully correlated, so that expanding the basis of decision
will reduce total variance through diversification and the law of large numbers. Again,
stated in terms of formal mathematical notation, this would depend on the precise
functional form of the information aggregation function G.
82. Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 26, at 1735.
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not imply that they would have a similar preference when litigating in
front of generalist judges and juries.
Additionally, to the extent that substantive interpretation reduces
the variance of interpretive outcomes, it is more valuable to relatively riskaverse parties, other things being equal. Conversely, contracting parties
who are less risk-averse or who have other methods of risk reduction available to them should be less willing to incur the costs of substantive interpretation. This latter category includes larger or more diversified businesses and other contractual repeat players, who can diversify
interpretation risk over a greater number of transactions, as well as agents
such as middlemen who are likely to be on both the buying and selling
side of transactions with equal frequency. The risk factor thus provides
an additional explanation for why such actors tend to use standard forms,
in addition to the more obvious reason of economies of scale.
3. PerformanceIncentives. - Variation in interpretive outcome is not
just a matter of risk, of course, because the parties' anticipation of what
enforcers will do can affect their incentive to perform their contractual
duties. For instance, legal error in assessing contractual damages following breach may induce either inefficient performance (if the tribunal
tends to overestimate damages) or inefficient breach (if the tribunal
tends to underestimate damages). Variations in the assessment of substantive duties may have similar effects. For instance, if the tribunal tends
to overestimate (underestimate) the promised level of product quality by
reading an express or implied warranty more broadly (narrowly) than the
parties intended, this may induce the seller to provide too much (little)
quality from an efficiency point of view. The distributional consequences
of these sorts of errors can be priced out on average, but the efficiency
consequences may remain. Lower variance in interpretive outcome, accordingly, can provide the parties with more precise performance
incentives.
The value of such increased precision, however, depends upon the
parties' circumstances, including the information available to them at the
time they make performance or precaution decisions and their ability to
renegotiate the contract ex post. The fact that tribunals vary in their potential assessments of damages, for example, should not lead to inefficient breach or performance so long as the assessment is correct on average, since the contracting parties are unlikely to know the particular
characteristics of their tribunal at the time they have to decide whether to
perform. In making their decisions, parties will be in a position of uncertainty and will only be able to compare the costs of performing against
the expected costs of paying damages for breach, averaged over the set of
all potential tribunals. A reduction in the tribunal's variance, accordingly, does not purchase any efficiency gains up front, so long as the parties are not risk-averse.
On the other hand, if parties do have information about the likely
direction of tribunal error at the relevant time of decisionmaking, their
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incentives to perform or take precautions against breach will be inefficient. For instance, suppose that a sales contract contains a clause that
requires the seller to deliver goods by June 1, but the parties as a matter
of trade usage understand the delivery date to be interpreted flexibly,
and in their understanding the seller has the option to deliver as late as
June 15 if market conditions make it unduly expensive to meet the June 1
date. If not all courts would recognize this implicit understanding absent
an inquiry into the commercial context, a seller who does not meet the
June 1 date will expect to be found in breach of contract with some positive probability. Depending on the damages that might be assessed and
the expected costs of any litigation, accordingly, he might be led to take
inefficiently costly precautions to guard against late delivery. If the inefficiency losses are high enough, it would be worth directing courts to in83
quire into trade usage before finding any liability.
The extent of these inefficiency losses, however, depends on the ex
post costs of disputing and renegotiation. Just because the original contract does not provide efficient incentives for performance does not
mean that an inefficient outcome will result, since the parties can modify
the contract after the fact to reach an efficient outcome. This renegotiation may entail an additional payment from one of the parties to another, but the expected cost of this payment can be calculated up front
84
and included in the original contract price.
Parties with relatively low ex post renegotiation costs, accordingly,
should tend to favor formalistic methods of interpretation, other things
being equal. This category includes parties who anticipate a continuing
relationship, parties who engage in many similar transactions or do business together regularly, and parties who expect to have symmetric information ex post regarding the costs and benefits of performance. Parties
for whom the transaction is an unusual one, parties in one-shot contracts,
and parties who expect there to be asymmetric information ex post
should tend to favor more substantive methods of interpretation as a substitute for their own ability to bargain to an efficient outcome. 85 Similarly, parties who have available to them other methods of ensuring effi83. They could also write their trade usage explicitly into the contract, but this has
transaction costs of its own and is likely to be cost-justified only for usages that are
unfamiliar to a sufficient number of courts, or that govern contingencies that are especially
likely to arise. If the contingency in which trade usage becomes relevant is of sufficiently
low probability, or if the likelihood of a given court being unfamiliar with it ex post is low,
then it will be cheaper for the parties to remain silent and to take the risk of an incorrect
interpretation.
84. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629, 633-36 (1988) (discussing how ex post
negotiations tend to lead to efficient outcomes).
85. CompareJason ScottJohnston's argument that legal regimes that use standards to
determine liability do a better job at encouraging bargaining under asymmetric
information than regimes that use rules. Jason Scott Johnson, Bargaining Under Rules
Versus Standards, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 257 (1995).
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cient performance, such as nonlegal or reputational sanctions
administered through membership in a commercial subcommunity, are
less likely to want to incur the expenses of substantive interpretation, and
other things being equal should prefer a formalist approach.
4. Reliance Incentives. - Much of the economics-of-contracts literature has emphasized the role of contractual liability in promoting investment in relationship-specific assets. Absent legal protection for such investments, rational contracting parties will underinvest in them from the
efficiency viewpoint, for fear of losing some or all of their value in an ex
post holdup. The standard intuition here is that because the asset is
worth little outside the specific relationship, the party who invests in it
becomes vulnerable to threats to terminate the relationship. Such threats
provide the noninvesting party with the bargaining power to obtain a unilaterally favorable modification. But investors' ability to anticipate such
opportunism reduces their incentive to make such investments in the first
place. In contrast to the problem of inefficient performance and breach,
ex post renegotiation cannot address this efficiency problem, since it is
precisely the prospect of such renegotiation that creates the threat of
holdup. 86 It can only guarantee that whatever investments are made are
put to efficient use ex post.
The need to encourage specific investments will influence the form/
substance decision whenever the value of the investment turns on the
nature of contractual interpretation. Many investments, even if they are
relationship-specific, will not depend on interpretation in this way. For
example, suppose that a supplier of complex industrial machinery must
invest substantial time and effort acquiring expertise about the specific
production process of a particular customer. This expertise is only partially transferable to relationships with other customers and is thus relationship-specific; in order to be induced to acquire it, the supplier must
be persuaded that a relationship with this particular customer is in the
offing. An important way to commit to such a relationship is through a
binding contractual promise. However, the value of the supplier's investment in expertise need not turn on the specific content of the contract; it
may be that knowing the customer's needs reduces the cost of providing
the customer with machinery of all sorts. In this case, the supplier need
not worry about unexpected contractual interpretations that leave the basic contract in place (for example, requiring the delivery of a machine
with this set of characteristics rather than that), since its investment in
expertise is equally sunk with all interpretations. The possible variation
in contract requirements does involve some risk, of course, but this can
be priced out or dealt with using the other methods described above.
86. See generally Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978) (explaining that specific
investments determine appropriate scope for vertical integration of the firm); Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J.L. & Econ. 233 (1979) (discussing specific investments as a type of transaction cost).
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On the other hand, there are some investments whose value turns on
the specifics of the task to be performed. A supplier who contracts to
supply goods within a narrow time window may need to take special precautions in storing inventory and arranging for timely shipment; it may
conversely fail to invest in facilities that would provide it with greater flexibility to deliver outside the window. If the contract is subsequently interpreted to provide the customer with greater discretion in specifying the
time of delivery, the supplier can become vulnerable to holdup; it may
have to agree to a substantial reduction in price in order to induce the
buyer to take delivery during the originally anticipated window. 8

7

A sec-

ond example is provided by the case of a supplier who promises to supply
finely milled machine parts of a particular specification. If the contract is
interpreted to allow the buyer more leeway to alter the specifications (or,
conversely, to insist on strict rather than substantive compliance with the
specifications), then the supplier will be relatively vulnerable to holdup if
its retooling costs are large, but relatively less vulnerable to holdup if its
retooling costs are small.
To the extent that a substantive interpretive approach improves the
quality of the enforcing tribunal's estimate of the parties' expectations
(that is, to the extent that it reduces the expected difference between the
interpretive outcomes ex post and the parties' interpretations at the time
they must sink their specific investments), it will reduce the potential for
such holdups. Other things being equal, parties who find it relatively important to undertake interpretation-specific investments, or whose investments are especially vulnerable to changes in contractual interpretation,
will therefore be more likely to want to opt into regimes of substantive
interpretation. Parties who do not need to make such investments, or
whose investments are more flexible, or who have other methods at their
disposal for dealing with contractual opportunism, will have less need for
interpretive accuracy and should tend to prefer relatively formalist
regimes.
5. Rent Seeking. - The discussion so far presumes that the costs of
writing and litigating contracts is exogenous to the parties' behavior, but
more generally this is not the case. Depending on the legal regime, the
parties can do various things ex ante or ex post to turn the bargain in
their favor. Under a regime of substantive interpretation, for instance,
parties may be tempted to invest substantial resources in litigation in order to maximize the chance of a favorable outcome. From the perspective of the contracting parties together, such behavior is wasteful, except
to the extent that it improves incentives for primary behavior. From the
point of view of litigants ex post, however, it is individually rational even if
there is no such incentive effect.
87. Conversely, if the contract is interpreted to require delivery within a window when
one or both of the parties understood the window to be more flexible, the party who is
caught short may have to pay a substantial ransom in exchange for being released from this

unanticipated obligation.

2004] FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

531

Formality, by limiting the scope for ex post interpretive disputes,
probably reduces the marginal productivity of litigation expenditure, and
thus reduces the amount of such expenditure. To the extent that it conditions the outcome of litigation on publicly available information, and
reduces the variations of litigants' expectations regarding that outcome,
it probably also encourages settlement.
On the other hand, rent-seeking can take place at the contract-writing stage as well. For example, I have elsewhere argued that one cost of
enforcing standard form contracts according to the plain meaning of
their written provisions is that those who write such contracts will be
tempted to sneak one-sided but inefficient terms into the fine print.88
Non-drafting parties will generally not find it worthwhile to examine standard forms with the care required to unearth such self-serving terms, so
they are likely instead to assume that such terms have been included and
discount the price they are willing to pay accordingly. (Even if parties do
examine the standard forms of their contractual partners, such an examination is costly.) Accordingly, both parties would find it useful to have a
way of committing to abstain from such behavior, and an interpretive regime that de-emphasizes the text of the agreement in favor of less manipulable considerations, such as market expectations, may provide such a
commitment device.
But there is, at least in theory, a similar risk of such manipulation
with regard to contextual materials, such as parol evidence. Just as parties may be tempted to sneak self-serving terms into the contractual text
under a formalist interpretive regime, they may be tempted to fill the
negotiating history with self-serving proposals and offers under a more
substantive interpretive regime, in the hopes of influencing the ultimate
result. 89 I am inclined to regard this latter risk as relatively less important, since in most cases the parties will have more symmetric and effective access to their common negotiating history than they will to each
others' standard forms. Blatantly self-serving attempts to manipulate parol evidence are more likely to be observed and parried during negotiations, while self-serving form terms are more likely to escape notice until
the contingencies they relate to have materialized. 90 Still, there is a theoretical tradeoff, so contracting parties concerned about such rent-seeking
will want to choose between relatively formal and relatively substantive
interpretive regimes depending upon whether they believe rent-seeking is
a more significant problem ex ante or ex post, and whether it is a more
88. Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts,
21 RAND J. Econ. 518, 533 (1990).
89. Eric Posner offers this risk as a possible reason in favor of a relatively formalistic
parol evidence rule. See E. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 23, at 564-65.
Compare the analogous arguments that advocates of strict statutory construction have
made with respect to incentives to create self-serving legislative history.
90. Again, this may contrast with the case of using legislative history in statutory
interpretation, since relevant actors may find it easier to introduce self-serving statements
into the official record without being noticed by their political adversaries.
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significant problem with respect to contractual text than with regard to
context. Certain types of contextual evidence may be more or less subject
to such manipulation; for instance, trade usage seems fairly immune to
rent-seeking ex ante, since no individual agent is in a position to have a
significant effect on it. On the other hand, to the extent that usage is
diffuse and there is room to argue about its substantive content, it is relatively susceptible to rent-seeking ex post. The restrictions on the admissibility of trade usage provided by U.C.C. section 1-205(6) may thus be
viewed as a way to lessen the rent-seeking costs associated with this type of
evidence.
6. Agency Problems. - Another commonly-cited reason for privileging
textual over contextual material when interpreting contracts is the need
to control the behavior of imperfectly loyal agents. Here it is worth distinguishing between two kinds of agency problems: problems in controlling the behavior of enforcing agents ex post, and problems in controlling the behavior of contracting agents ex ante.
a. Controlling Enforcing Agents Ex Post. - While implementing the
contracting parties' intentions is a major and perhaps primary consideration when courts interpret their agreements, it is far from the only factor.
Courts and other tribunals may be tempted to tailor their interpretations,
if only marginally, in furtherance of other goals such as distributional
equity, risk sharing ex post, or corrective justice. Since none of these
goals are in the ex ante interests of the contracting parties, the parties
would like to arrange the interpretive process so as to minimize the influence of such considerations, to the extent that they can do so at reasonable cost.
One obvious way to do this is to choose in advance a tribunal that is
expected to give greater weight to the expected value of the contract, and
lesser weight to the tribunal's own countervailing values. Choice of law
and, especially, arbitration clauses are straightforward ways of implementing such a choice. But it has often been suggested that restricting the
scope of admissible interpretive materials has a similar constraining
effect.
Whether this is the case is not clear and depends on a closer study of
the particular agent in question and the professional community to
whom the agent looks for validation. Certainly, the expansion of the informational universe provides additional opportunities for a court seeking to promote its own values to find justification for its actions. 9 1 But as
the Legal Realists famously argued, a court bent on ignoring the parties'
91. A possible example of this phenomenon may be found in Nanakuli Paving & Rock
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 779-80 (9th Cir. 1981), in which the court directed the
admission before a local jury of trade usage evidence purporting to show that Shell had
promised Nanakuli, a small local paving company to whom Shell was selling asphalt, that it
would protect Nanakuli against any price increases that came after the placing of
Nanakuli's order and before delivery, notwithstanding a written contract term providing
that the price would be "Shell's Posted Price at time of delivery," and notwithstanding the
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intentions in favor of its own policy values also has substantial freedom to
do so under a more formal interpretive regime.
b. Controlling ContractingAgents Ex Ante. - Many contracting parties
are not individuals, but organizations that can only act through individual
agent& Because the incentives of the agents are imperfectly aligned with
those of the organization, agents may not behave in a value-maximizing
way when entering into a contract or engaging in actions that may affect
contractual terms. For example, an insurance agent may make inaccurate representations about policy coverage or about an applicant's insurability in order to earn a commission, or a manager charged with supervising a supplier's obligations may shirk by failing to object to defective
performance, thus providing the supplier with a plausible claim of waiver.
In such contexts, formalism can be used by one group of organizational actors to disable other actors from binding the organization on
terms that might be in the latter actors' private interests, but not the interests of the organization.9 2 Merger clauses, for example, can be used to
take contracting power away from the sales and purchasing agents who
orally represent the organization in its dealings with outsiders, and to
consolidate that power in the managers and legal professionals who control the official texts of company documents. Similarly, anti-waiver
clauses can be used to protect an organization against shirking by its enforcement agents.
It is important to recognize, however, that the individuals who control the formal text of an organization's contractual agreement are no
less agents than those who control the less formal context. Most commercial form contracts are drafted by lawyers, either in-house or not, whose
compensation structure provides them with incentives that are not identical or even proportional to the benefits and costs to the firm that employs
them. For example, a company lawyer charged with drafting terms in a
standard form is probably more likely to be punished for omitting a term
that turns out to lead in some remote contingency to a loss for the firm,
than he or she is to be rewarded for the time saved by the omission in the
far more probable event that the term is unnecessary. The asymmetric
nature of the payoff will lead the lawyer to overdraft the contract. Similarly, the lawyer is unlikely to be rewarded for creating terms that increase
the value of the contract to customers or, if he or she works in isolation
text of U.C.C. section 1-205(4), which provides that when express terms and trade usage
cannot be read together consistently, express terms control contractual meaning.
92. See, e.g., Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule
and Pre-contractual Misrepresentations, 33 Val. U. L. Rev. 485, 534 (1999) (arguing that in
the interests of minimizing agency costs, sophisticated commercial parties should be
allowed to disclaim liability for their agents' extra-contractual representations); Avery
Wiener Katz, On the Use of Practitioner Surveys in Commercial Law Research: Comments
on Daniel Keating's 'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action,' 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2760,
2769-70 (2000) (offering agency-cost interpretation of the battle of the forms); E. Posner,
The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 23, at 563-64 (suggesting that rational firms consider
the costs of shirking by agents when adopting merger clauses).
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from the sales department, even to know what such terms might be. For
that reason, he or she will likely draft terms that are inefficiently favorable
to the company, in that they shift risks and duties to customers that from
a business viewpoint are more cheaply borne by the company. Adjusting
the contract so that it better fits the needs of the customer and makes
him or her willing to buy, accordingly, is a task usually left to sales agents,
not lawyers.
Thus, an organization should favor formal over substantive methods
of interpretation if it has established relatively efficient incentive structures for controlling the behavior of its legal department, and relatively
inefficient incentive structures for controlling the behavior of its sales
and purchasing departments. If the agency problems are greater with
respect to the organization's lawyers, conversely, it should prefer a less
formal interpretive regime. The optimal choice may depend on the administrative tools available and on other agency problems that the organization faces. For example, due to difficulties in monitoring the effort
level of sales agents, it may be desirable to give them high-powered incentives by providing the bulk of their compensation in the form of commissions. Given the incentives set up by the commission system, it may then
make sense to limit the sales staff's ability to vary contract terms by use of
standard forms including a merger clause, especially if the lawyer's compensation is reasonably well tied to the overall profits of the firm. On the
other hand, if it is feasible to establish a chargeback system whereby sales
agents' earnings are reduced in an amount proportional to the number
of disputes arising out of their sales, or by the extra costs necessary to
service the special terms promised to their customers, and if the lawyer
drafting the contract is an independent contractor rather than an ongoing member of the organization, then the sales agents may be in a better
position to balance the costs and benefits to the organization when making informal promises and representations.
7. Liquidity and the Cost of Other Complementary Services. - Finally, the
optimal choice between form and substance may depend on the importance of third-party contributions to the value of the contract. For example, a buyer of commercial machinery may need to borrow funds in order
to pay for its purchase, and will usually be able to borrow at a lower rate if
it pledges the machinery as collateral. Similarly, a seller of consumer
goods will be able to make credit sales at a lower price if it can sell its
customer accounts to a commercial factor, who specializes in buying such
accounts and can service them and bear default risk at a lower cost. Another example would be a buyer who purchases two specialized pieces of
equipment from two different suppliers when the two items are intended
to be used together; in this case the terms of the buyer's arrangement
with one supplier (e.g., terms granting the supplier the discretion to alter
the specifications) will affect the terms it can get from the other supplier.
In such cases, the third party's ability to provide such complementary
services at low cost will depend in part on the cost it faces when determin-
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ing the terms of the supported contract. If a factor has to worry about an
account debtor asserting defenses when it comes time to collect on the
account, the amount it is willing to lend against the account will be reduced accordingly. If the factor can effectively assess the risk of such defenses from an examination of the underlying contract's text, however, it
can price the risk out, hold back an amount in reserve that corresponds
to the expected value of uncollectible accounts, and lend the balance. If
the existence of such defenses depends upon more contextual factors,
such as oral communications between the account debtor and the seller's
sales agents, the factor will need to be more conservative and will not be
able to lend at the same rate or in the same amount. Casting the account
in the form of a negotiable instrument, however, or including a holderin-due-course clause in the original sales agreement, lowers the factor's
costs by reducing the risk of nonpayment resulting from a cause that the
factor could not assess ex ante. Other formal devices, including merger
clauses, antiwaiver clauses, and the like, similarly lower the costs to third
parties of providing supporting services, and thus enable those parties to
provide the services at lower cost.
In general, contracts whose value depends significantly on the participation of or the purchase of complementary services from third parties
will have higher value when interpreted under a relatively formalistic regime, other things being equal. But this conclusion need not always
hold. In some cases, the relevant third party may face higher costs when
assessing contractual text than when assessing contextual factors such as
trade usage. If the third party is not a legal specialist, for example, as in
the case of a third-party guaranty supplied by a friend or family member
of the primary obligor, or in the case of a specific investment undertaken
by a trade creditor or senior employee who finds it cheaper to observe
the parties' ordinary business actions and informal commercial reputations than to examine the details of their written contract, then a more
substantive approach to interpretation will protect the third party at
lower cost, and thus will make him or her willing to provide the complementary services on more favorable terms.
B. Choosing Between Form and Substance: A Survey of Economic Criteria
Because the list of economic and commercial considerations relevant
to the choice between formal and substantive interpretation is long, and
because the various considerations may well cut in opposite directions in
individual cases, drawing specific conclusions regarding how to apply the
above framework must be tentative at best. Indeed, it is for these very
reasons that I argue that public lawmakers are not in a particularly good
position to issue strong prescriptions regarding the proper balance between form and substance, and that private parties should be allowed the
leeway to choose their favored interpretative regime. Nonetheless, the
foregoing discussion does suggest some general rules of thumb in this
regard. The summary table lists a number of such heuristic principles,
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Example

Ex ante negotiadon costs are relatively low

Repeat players,
high-value transacdons, contracts
negotiated byjunior agents

Ex ante negotiation costs are relatively high

One-shot players,
low-value transacdons, contracts
negotiated by
senior principals

Renegotiation
costs are relatively
low

Repeat players,
socially-connected
parties

Renegotiation
costs are relatively
high

One-shot players,
isolated parties

Chances of dispute are relatively
high

High variation in
ex post value of
exchange

Chances of dispute are relatively
low

Low variation in
ex post value of
exchange

Tribunals are con- Expert tribunals,
sistent in their
parties trading
interpretation of
within a single
form ex post
jurisdiction

Tribunals vary in
their interpretation of form ex
post

Generalist tribunals, parties trading across
jurisdictions

Parties are consistent in their interpretation of form
ex ante

Parties who trade
using a common
form

Parties vary in
their interpretation of form ex
ante

Parties who trade
with different
forms, parties
unfamiliar with
forms

Parties have
access to effective
non-legal sanctions

Socially-connected
parties

Parties are relying
on legal sanctions
to motivate performance

Isolated parties

Parties expect
courts to be
biased in interpreting contract

Jurisdictions
where tribunals
have distinct policy preferences

Parties expect
courts to interpret
contract accurately on average

Jurisdictions
where tribunals
do not have distinct policy preferences

Reliance
incentives

Specific investments do not
depend on context

Thick markets,
traders of relatively fungible
commodities

Specific investments depend on
context

Thin markets, custom-made goods
or services

Rent-seeking

Legal outcomes
are relatively sensitive to litigation
expenditure

Law is unsettled

Legal outcomes
are relatively
insensitive to litigation expenditure

Law is settled

Ex post stakes are
high

High variation in
value of exchange

Ex post stakes are
low

Low variation in
value of exchange

Principals have
relatively weaker
control over
negotiating agents

Large firms with
extended contracting networks,
in-house legal services

Principals have
relatively weaker
control over drafting agents

Small firms with
limited contracting networks,
for-hire legal services

One or both parties subject to bias
in litigation

Deep-pocket parties, unpopular
parties, out-ofjurisdiction parties

Little risk of bias
in litigation

Jurisdiction with
strong reputation
for equal treatment

Exchange
requires complementary input
from distant
strangers

Negotiable instrnments, letters of
credit

Exchange requires
complementary
input from mercantile insiders

Guaranties by
affiliated parties,
specific investments by senior
employees or
trade creditors

Risk

Performance
incentives

Agency
problems

Third-party
investment
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together with an illustrative example for each principle that shows which
kinds of contractors might be in a position to make use of it.
As we can see from the table, some aspects of the conventional wisdom regarding form and substance are borne out by our framework. The
framework suggests, for instance, that small and infrequent traders will
tend to benefit from a more substantive interpretative regime for a variety
of reasons: they are relatively less well-placed to undertake the fixed cost
of detailed ex ante negotiation; they have relatively poor access to reputational networks ex post; they are likely to do their own contract negotiating but to contract out when acquiring legal services; they are less likely
to be able to recover specific investments in other exchanges; and they
are possibly less likely to face bias in ex post judicial tribunals. Conversely, large and experienced mercantile traders should prefer their contracts to be governed by relatively formalistic rules of interpretation-and
this prediction is consonant with the observation that, in general, it is
such traders whom we observe contracting into relatively formal enforcement regimes through devices such as arbitration, choice of law, and forum selection clauses. Such preference could stem from such traders'
ability to amortize the fixed cost of detailed ex ante negotiation over a
series of transactions, from their relatively good access to nonlegal enforcement via reputational networks, from the fact that their large size
weakens their control over their sales and purchasing agents, but
strengthens their control over their lawyers, from their greater ability to
recover specific investments in substitute exchanges, and from their
greater wariness of biased tribunals and juries. Thus our analysis lends
some support to the common claim that contracts between merchants
and commercial specialists should be interpreted more formally and with
less judicial supervision than contracts between less experienced parties
or between merchants on the one hand and consumers or employees on
93
the other.
CONCLUSION

Interpretation is an essential aspect of all fields of law-statutory,
common law, and constitutional-but it looms especially large in the area
of contracts. This is so for two interrelated reasons. First, from an ex
post perspective, judicial officials called on to enforce an asserted private
agreement as law face special difficulties in determining whether the
agreement was actually established, what obligations it provides, and what
to do if the agreement's terms appear incomplete, ambiguous, or contradictory. Contractual lawmaking is typically decentralized, acts of legal significance commonly take place in private, the participants are often legal
amateurs, and their purposes and methods of communication are highly
93. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 28, at 544-45 (conceding
that their strong normative recommendations in favor of formal interpretation should be
limited to contracts among experienced commercial parties).
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varied. In contrast to a professional legislature with its public records and
voting procedures, or a court with its official rulings and published opinions, individual contracting parties can regard themselves as having created legal obligations over a period of time without being able to identify
the precise moment at which such obligations came into force. It should
be no surprise that disagreements over interpretation are a primary cause
of litigated contract disputes.
Second, from an ex ante perspective, contracting parties have substantial leeway to influence subsequent interpretation by the manner in
which they conclude their agreement. They can take more or less care to
identify their underlying assumptions and to communicate their intentions to each other; they can anticipate possible interpretative disputes
and settle them in advance; and they can create and preserve evidence of
their understandings through the use of writings and other permanent
documents, independent witnesses, and terms of art. Helping the parties
to translate their underlying bargain into something that can actually be
applied to guide (if not to bind) their subsequent behavior is the main
professional task a transactional lawyer faces.
Most scholarly discussion of interpretive problems, however, especially that dealing with the tension between form and substance, has been
addressed to courts and other public lawmakers, and not to private contracting parties. The participants in this discussion have argued for formal and for substantive approaches to interpretation, and have based
their recommendations on grounds of efficiency, fairness, and party autonomy. But even those who have disagreed on policy recommendations
or normative commitments have found common ground in their choice
of audience.
This Essay has argued that the traditional scholarly approach to form
and substance founders on a lack of information about the likely consequences of formal and substantive modes of interpretation. From an efficiency viewpoint, the information available at the general level at which
courts and legislatures must operate is inadequate to determine the relative magnitude of the relevant transaction costs. From an autonomy viewpoint, the traditional stance of the court system neglects the possibility
that different parties in different contexts might prefer-or ought to be
delegated the power to choose-one interpretive approach over other.
One does see distinctions drawn in the case law and in the commentary
between different sorts of contracts; it is generally acknowledged that formalism is relatively more important to experienced commercial actors,
and substantive interpretation better suited to transactions involving consumers and other amateurs. But as far as I know there has been no systematic attempt to determine, using the standard tools and methods of
the economics of contracts, in which contexts and for which parties formalism is most useful and in which contexts and for which parties a substantive approach is most useful. This Essay has aimed to lay out a basic
framework within which such a systematic analysis could take place.

